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Regional variation in apprenticeship and  
permanent employment rates: which causes? 
 
Daniela Sonedda 






A fundamental observation of the 21st century is the substantial drop in permanent employment 
occupations. In this paper, I seek to understand the geographic variation in apprenticeship and the 
consequent permanent employment rates. I exploit a unique setting in Italy to verify whether regional 
disparities in general education and production systems play a key role in determining vocational 
apprenticeship rates and in determining how this labor contract creates job matches that persist over 
time. I find that when the quality of the regional education system is good, the medium-run gains in 
terms of permanent employment can be moderate. However, a small number of active firms in a 
region limits the quantity of job entries as apprentices. 
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1 Introduction
What determines the geographic variation of apprenticeship and their conversion into
permanent employment occupations? The ability to create not only jobs but good jobs is
a prime policy issue as dictated by technological innovation and globalization processes.
One expects that a commitment to invest in human capital can contribute to the creation of
a good quality job and the consequent permanent employment position. If this is the case,
apprenticeships have an advantage over the other labor contracts to lead to permanent
employment. Why are not apprenticeships more widespread? The answer is because
there exist influential factors that restrict their use. The question that I study, namely,
the geographic variation of vocational apprenticeship and permanent employment rates
as related to the regional education and production system, has received somewhat few
attention. While there has been some interest in cross-country di↵erences in apprenticeship
rates, the within-country variation has been much less studied.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the role of the general education and produc-
tion systems in determining the regional variation of vocational apprenticeship and the
consequent permanent employment rates. I exploit Italian regional disparities in these
systems and random assignment of individuals into regions at birth to shed light on this
issue. Looking at geographic variations is important to fill some gaps in the literature.
The presence of a legally enforceable commitment of the firms to training provision ex-
plains why firm-based vocational training schemes work in some countries but not in others
(Dustmann and Scho¨nberg 2012). However, this nationwide institutional setting is a nec-
essary but not su cient condition to influence the willingness of firms to provide training.
For instance, on the basis of this argument only, it would be hard to justify the existence
of di↵erences within and across industries. These di↵erences are analyzed by Dustmann
and Scho¨nberg (2009) who focus on the role of the degree of unionization. The argument
that unions serve as commitment and as wage floor device is convincing. Nevertheless,
further explanations are still missing. Otherwise, in countries like Switzerland and Ger-
many where the apprenticeship labor contract works, regional di↵erences are only due to
di↵erences in the degree of unionization (or in the degree of the enforceable commitment
of the firms to training provision).
This paper contributes to the literature by presenting new empirical evidence that
points to the importance of two influencing factors: the general education and production
systems. Regional variations in these systems contribute to explain not only regional
di↵erences in the apprenticeship rate but also the extent to which apprenticeships serve
as a stepping stone into permanent employment. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first paper that tackles this empirical issue.
I use a very rich administrative dataset, by the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social
Policies, CICO (the so-called Comunicazioni Obbligatorie). I exploit a unique setting in
Italy to analyze the role of the general education and production systems in determining
the regional variation of vocational apprenticeship and the consequent permanent employ-
ment rates. Since 2008 apprenticeships in Italy are considered permanent labor contracts.
However there are two important di↵erences between apprenticeships and standard open-
ended contract. Apprenticeships are committed to provide, for a certain period, on-the-job
training and general education outside the firms. At the end of this training period the
firm could withdraw from the contract with a notice without paying firing costs. In ab-
sence of this notice the firm converts automatically the contract into a standard permanent
labor contract. The length of the training period mainly ranges between six months and 3
years while standard open-ended contracts have a maximum of six months of probationary
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period. A reform introduced in 2012 by law no.92 enforced the usage of the apprenticeship
labor contract as the main port of entry into permanent employment. On the top of these
two facts, Italy is characterized by a further dualism within a dual labor market1: the
North-South divide which is possibly related to regional disparities that interact with the
functioning of the labor market.
I assume that the data generating process of the permanent employment rate is re-
lated to the legal rule that in Italy a job entry as apprentice is only available, albeit not
mandatory, up to 29 years and 364 days of age. This yields to a discontinuity in the per-
manent employment rate around the cuto↵ of 30 years of age. This discontinuity in the
permanent employment rate can depend on the apprenticeship labor contract only. There
is no reason to observe such data generating process of permanent employment in case of
transitions from either unemployment or from a temporary labor contract. On the top of
that, I expect that the introduction of law no. 92/2012 has exogenously changed this data
generating process. In fact, the law enforced a mentoring scheme to strengthen the voca-
tional training component of the job. This rule was complemented by a future punishment
to the firm that avoided to maintain on a permanent basis at least 30% of those hired as
apprentices three years before. Hence, the reform reinforced the commitment of the firm
to employ permanently the apprentices and discouraged the production oriented usage of
the contract.
This unique setting allows me to design a di↵erence in discontinuity regression model.
That is, I can compare individuals who reached the threshold age after the introduction
of the reform to similar untreated individuals born in contiguous cohorts who reached the
cuto↵ age before the reform. Hence, the labor market reform, creates a source of random-
ized variation at the threshold age. Since this variation is randomized, it is independent of
any observable factor that can be added as a covariate in the regression model, including
the indicator of the location of work. This paper adds to the literature the analysis of the
geographical variation of apprenticeship and the consequent permanent employment rates
as related to regional di↵erences in the education and production systems. On the one
hand, these di↵erences help explaining that the number of active firms in a region limits
the quantity of job entries as apprentices. On the other hand, the quality of the education
system a↵ects the capacity of the apprenticeship labor contract to create jobs that persists
over time. This analysis di↵ers from the few existing studies using data at regional level
in four crucial aspects (see for instance Brunello and De Paola 2008, Muehlemann and
Wolter 2008). First, exploiting a randomized variation, this paper overcomes one of the
major problem that has to be faced when analyzing regional di↵erences in labor market
outcomes: the region of work is not exogenous. In my research design, the heterogeneity
across regions of the estimated di↵erence in discontinuity e↵ects on apprenticeship and
permanent employment rates is entirely driven by the exogenous assignment of individuals
into regions at birth. This generated a randomized source of geographic variation. On
the top of that, the ignorability assumption clearly holds in my empirical analysis because
individuals cannot control the features of the regional distribution of the average quality
of the education system and firm landscape. Second, the main outcome is the individual’s
permanent employment probability and how it is related to the apprenticeship probability
rather than the training decision of the firm. Third, I analyze the role of the quality of
the regional education and production systems in determining the size of these di↵erence
in discontinuity impacts at the baseline and in the medium-run. For instance, it could
1According to the original definition of Doeringer and Piore (1971), labor markets are dual in nature if
they are segregated into primary and secondary spheres.
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be the case that in the medium-run it is not the number of firms or the number of em-
ployees per squared kilometer that matter per se´. If there are complementarities between
former education and the on-the-job human capital investment, a qualitative, rather than
a quantitative, measure of general education better contributes to determine the number
of potential apprentices with long-term employment perspectives . This qualitative mea-
sure(s) corresponds to the percentage of individuals who scored the maximum level in
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests in math and reading
performance. By the same token, the limited number of active firms in a region2 could
serve as a barrier to the quantity of successful apprenticeship labor contracts. In fact,
for both employer and employees, the apprenticeship contract implies a costly investment
whose future return is uncertain. It is, therefore, likely that only firms with medium-long
terms production opportunities invest on it. Fourth, last but not least, any of these pa-
pers estimates the dynamic e↵ects on permanent employment of the initial human capital
investment.
I find that the capacity of the apprenticeship labor contract to serve as a stepping stone
into permanent employment is limited when the quality of the education system is low and
the number of active firms is small. Di↵erent results emerge when instead the quality of
the education system is high. In such a case, the medium-run gains in terms of permanent
employment are moderate. This is possibly revealing the existence of complementarities
between former education and further human capital accumulation.
Hence, my contribution is to show that geographic variations in the education system
coupled with di↵erence production opportunities across regions can explain some of the
observed facts of a North-South divide in Italy in permanent employment rates. In par-
ticular, it can explain why in some regions the quantity of job entries as apprentices is
limited. Moreover, the existence of complementarities between former education and on-
the-job human capital investment rationalizes the finding that regions with high quality of
upper secondary education have higher permanent employment gains from the vocational
apprenticeship labor contract.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the related literature.
Section 3 describes the institutional framework and the geographic variation of those who
have a higher permanent employment probability. Section 4 illustrates the data and Section
5 discusses the empirical model. Results are reported in section 6. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2 Related literature
The article is related to at least three strands of the literature.
First, the e↵ect of dualism on labor markets has been widely analyzed, see for instance
Dolado (2017). From every angle this issue is looked at, in a dual labor market employers
are more reluctant to hire workers on a permanent basis. This literature focuses on the
role of the employment protection legislation and reaches no clear consensus on which kind
of labor contract can be used as the main port of entry into stable, high quality, employ-
ment. On the one hand, it is generally assumed that temporary contracts do not bear
the firing costs which have to be paid to terminate permanent contracts. By decreasing
firing costs, temporary jobs could, theoretically, be useful to young inexperienced workers
to raise their job experience easing their transition towards permanent employment. After
2Of course, it is likely that the limited number of firms and the limited number of productive firms are
correlated.
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a period of screening, the firm could convert these contracts, letting them be stepping
stones into permanent employment (Holmlund and Storrie 2002, Booth, Francesconi and
Frank 2002, Heinrich, Mueser and Troske 2005, Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini 2008). How-
ever, as suggested by Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2016), in all countries, open-ended
occupations comprise probationary periods and temporary works cannot be terminated
before their ending date. As a result, firms profitably screen temporary workers only if
the duration of the probationary period is shorter than that of fixed term contracts. The
authors consider a job search and matching model where the use of temporary contracts
hinges on the heterogeneity of expected production opportunities. Short-term (even very
short ones) contracts can emerge in equilibrium because they are used for production op-
portunities with short expected durations. Workers could, therefore, end up moving from
one temporary contract to another letting these contracts be dead-end jobs (Blanchard
and Landier 2002, Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002, Boeri and Garibaldi 2007). Moreover, as
the expected duration of fixed term contracts gets shorter, firms are less likely to invest in
workers’ training because the return of this investment in human capital is low, if positive.
Besides, fixed-terms workers are more likely to lose their incentives to exert more e↵ort
to accumulate better productive capabilities. As a result, the successfulness of temporary
labor contracts to help employers to screen workers’ ability and employees to sort in better
jobs could be limited.
Second, I complement the literature on the determinants of firm sponsored training.
I present new empirical evidence on the factors that could make an investment in human
capital be a device to optimize the screening-sorting processes that lead to permanent
employment. To this extent, the apprenticeship labor contract can have an advantage
over the other labor contracts. In Italy since 2008 apprenticeship contracts are considered
permanent labor contracts. Vocational apprenticeship training allows individuals to accu-
mulate human capital which translates into ex-post higher productivity. The informational
content of the contract is crucial here. In fact, informational asymmetries convert general
into specific training since the current employer has an informational advantage on his
employees’ productivity relative to other firms (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Acemoglu
and Pischke 1999). Both firms (in terms of monopsony rents) and individuals (in terms
of higher future wages and higher probability of permanent employment) benefit of the
higher worker’s productivity. Firms and workers share also the cost of this human capital
investment. Firms are required, to train on-the-job the apprentice and during time of work,
to let him/her attend external courses provided by local authorities or accredited training
institutes sponsored by the regions. Firms are partly compensated for the training costs
by a tax rebate. From the workers’ perspective the apprenticeship labor contract is costly
because it requires costly e↵ort and it implies a lower initial wage. To some extent, the
lower initial wage eliminates the wage rigidity which prevents an o↵setting transfer from
workers to firms in exchange for being insured against job losses (Lazear 1990). In fact,
there are some analogies with a contract that fix a performance related pay component
of (future) earnings. The costs of the vocational training and the general education pro-
vided by the contract and the lower initial wage are compensated by a permanent labor
contract and higher earnings in the future. The rationale is here similar to Macho-Stadler,
Perez-Castrillo and Porteiro (2014) who argue that long-term contracts allow the better
provision of incentives because firms can credibly transfer payments from earlier to later
periods in the life of the workers. The higher the worker e↵ort is, the higher the probability
of a long-lasting employment relationship, the higher future earnings will be.
However, there might be further explanations on the successfulness of the apprentice-
ship labor contract over and above the informational content. In absence of these further
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mechanisms it would be di cult to explain di↵erences across countries. In fact, informa-
tion asymmetries and skill specificity are not likely to vary greatly across countries while
institutional attributes do. An important contribution in this direction is provided by
Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2012) who relate the successfulness of apprenticeships to the
commitment to training provision guaranteed by the countries’ institutional framework.
While the authors focus on a mechanism which clearly explains why apprenticeship per-
forms better in a country rather than another, it does not completely address the issue of
why there might be di↵erences across regions, sectors and occupations within a country. A
potential explanation of the existence of within and across industries di↵erences relies on
Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2009) who account for such di↵erences in terms of the degree
of unionization. In fact, unions set a wage floor, which is another influencing factor of the
firm decision to provide training. From the employees’ perspective, unionized firms o↵er a
long-term wage contract. In the future, at least the union wage has to be paid. From the
employer’s point of view, the unions’ wage floor determines wage compression. As long as
the equilibrium wage structure is more compressed than the productivity di↵erentials, the
firm makes greater profits from more skilled workers. Consequently, if the training costs
are not too large, it is profitable for the employer to invest in the employee’s human capi-
tal (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). Dustmann and Scho¨nberg
(2009) provide empirical evidence that apprenticeship training is higher in unionized firms
in Germany. However, geographic variations in apprenticeship rates are hardly explained
by regional di↵erences in the degree of unionization.
Third, very few papers present empirical evidence on the firm decision to provide
training using data at regional level. Brunello and De Paola (2008) study the relationship
between local labor market density and firm sponsored training. The local labour market
density is measured by the number of employees per squared kilometer in a province.
The authors show that, theoretically, the e↵ect of economic density on the firm decision
to train cannot be signed. On the one hand, a higher density of the local labor market
increases productivity and consequently encourages firms to invest more in training. On
the other hand, a higher density of the local labor market reduces the rents of the firms
and consequently lowers the incentive to train. They use data on more than 1000 Italian
manufacturing firms, drawn from the Survey of Italian Manufacturing by Mediocredito
Centrale, to present estimates on such relationship. They find that the local agglomeration
pattern has a negative and statistically di↵erent from zero impact on the willingness of
the firms to invest in the employees’ human capital. Muehlemann and Wolter (2008) use
a representative firm level data set to estimate whether the local industry structure and
education system a↵ects the decision of the firm to hire apprentices in Switzerland. The
local industry structure is proxied by the number of competing firms situated in the same
geographical area. In the attempt to avoid endogeneity issues related to the geographical
location of the firm, the authors define the geographical area in terms of travel distances
rather than political borders. The local education system is measured in three di↵erent
ways: by the local number of young people of school-leaving age; by the local share of
pupils of foreign nationality and by the local share of young people completing compulsory
education that opted for grammar schools in 1995. They find that while the number of
competing firms situated in the same geographical area a↵ects negatively the probability
of apprenticeship training, the number of young people of school-leaving age in the area
has instead a positive impact on it.
Although there is an emerging line of inquiry studying the relationship between local
labor markets and geography, there is limited, if any, work done on the geographic variation
in vocational apprenticeship and permanent employment rates and their relationship with
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the regional education and production systems. My understanding of the observed di↵er-
ences in permanent occupations across regions and their implications is an understudied
area of research in economic geography. In this paper, I seek to unpack these geographic
variations and how this may inform on how a labor contract committed to a costly human
capital investment, serves as a stepping stone into permanent employment. Specifically, I
exploit a unique setting to study these relationships looking at the geographic heterogene-
ity in Italy of the impact of the labor market reform (law no. 92/2012) at the threshold
of 30 years of age, above which job entries as vocational apprentices are not possible.
3 Institutional framework and geographic variations in per-
manent employment probability
Since 2001 Italian regions have exclusive power to legislate over vocational training and
they are responsible for planning the integration between the vocational training and the
school system. For this reason when law no 30/2003 and legislative decree no. 276/2003
introduced new normative requirements for the apprenticeship labor contract, regional
governments had to issue regional regulations. The timing of the implementation of the
2003 reform was therefore di↵erent across regions and across sectors because of di↵erent
timing in contract renewals. Cappellari, Dell’Aringa and Leonardi (2012) exploit this
variability across regions and sectors to show that this reform had an overall productivity
enhancing e↵ect. The 2003 reform also introduced the vocational apprenticeship labor
contract to which I give my attention. Here, instead, I neglect the role of the traditional
apprenticeship contract (apprenticeship for vocational qualifications and diplomas, upper
secondary education diplomas and high technical specialization certificates), that can be
assimilated to a vocational and education training program alternative to a more academic
track. This is because the age limit for this contract is below the age range considered
in my analysis. In what follows, vocational apprenticeship is a open-ended (since 2008)
labor contract committed to an initial human capital investment whose age limit to be
signed is 29 years and 364 days. Despite the open-ended nature of the contract, the
firm can withdraw from it when the training period expires. If the employer does not,
the apprenticeship labor contract is automatically converted into a standard permanent
contract. Legislative decree no. 167/2011, established a common regulation across all
regions. For this reason, I do not exploit the geographic variations generated by law no
30/2003. Rather I take advantage of the fact that in this common rule framework, law no.
92/2012, known as Fornero Reform, changed further the vocational apprenticeship labor
contract. In fact, law no. 92/2012 implemented one of the major reform of the Italian
labor market. The main changes concerned the contract of salaried employment, social
safety nets and the dismissal regulations. In dealing with reforming the type and number
of contract salaried, the law explicitly stated that apprenticeship labor contract was meant
to be the main port of entry to permanent employment for young people. The law also
fixed the minimum length of the training period to six months and the maximum length
to three years (before it was six years), although there could be some exceptions. This
implies that individuals aged more than 30 can work as apprentices but they cannot entry
into a new job position as apprentices. The law enforced a mentoring scheme fixing a ratio
between apprentices and qualified workers in the same job occupation. The law introduced
a future punishment on the firms which did not accomplish with the open ended nature of
the contract. In fact, these firms could not hire more than one apprentice three years after
the job entry of the apprentices if less than 30% (50% since 2016) of them were not still
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employed by the firm. Individual dismissals and motivated lay-o↵s are not included in the
calculation of this percentage. Finally, the law increased the social security contributions
burdened on temporary contracts while keeping fixed the tax rebate on apprenticeship
contracts. All these three measures contribute to create a randomized source of variation
that takes the form of a di↵erence in discontinuity around the threshold age of 30. Since
the institutional framework is common across all Italian regions, where could geographic
variations come from? In what follows, I will focus on the average quality of the regional
general education system and on the average number of active firms (and some of their
characteristics) in a region as influencing factors in the creation of a permanent job position
through the apprenticeship labor contract. These regional determinants play a role over
and above di↵erences in the quality of regional general education courses which were not
a↵ected by the labor market reform. Individuals can control their decision to migrate to
another region when accepting a new job. Nevertheless, they cannot control the position
in the corresponding regional distribution of the average quality of the general education
system and on the average number of active firms in the region where they work. This
argument could su ce to identify causal e↵ects. Nevertheless, there is even a more strong
argument that explains why the identified e↵ects are causal and where the geographical
variations come from. Distance from where one lives seems to be a very strong and negative
predictor of job acceptance (Combes and Duranton 2006, Dal Bo´, Finan and Rossi 2013,
Manning and Petrongolo 2017). This is because of the existence of high commuting costs
or idiosyncratic preferences for location. Other reasons geographical proximity may be
an important factor of the creation of permanent occupations are the firm’s informational
cost of identifying the good worker and the individuals’ informational cost of identifying
the good firm. These informational costs are larger across regions than within them. As
a result, geographic variation of good workers (and firms) might be observed as long as
higher production opportunities and productivity advantages of agglomeration economies
exist (Serafinelli forthcoming, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti 2010, Combes, Duranton,
Gobillon, Puga and Roux 2012, Gathmann, Helm and Scho¨nberg forthcoming). I provide
suggestive evidence of this geographic variation. I define potentially good workers similarly
to Serafinelli (forthcoming) who identifies potentially high-productivity firms as those that
pay a relatively high firm-specific wage premium. Here, good workers are expressed in
terms of higher permanent employment advantages. Good workers are those who have a
relatively high individual-specific probability of permanent employment. The estimated
firm e↵ects characterize firm production opportunities and are also helpful to underline
the observed geographic variation in permanent job creation and its relationship with the
regional education and production systems. This definition is consistent with recent models
of frictional labor markets (e.g., Cahuc et al. (2016)), in which permanent employment
occupations are created by firms with higher expected production opportunities.
For the working sample in the period from January 2010 to December 2014, I specify
a linear probability model of permanent employment, as follows:
yijt = ✓i +  j +  t + rwijt + ri + sijt + b1Xit + uijt (1)
where the dependent variable, the permanent employment probability of worker i who
was born in region r and work in region rw in sector s for firm j in year t3, is expressed
as a function of individual heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and measured time-varying
characteristics.4
3Time fixed e↵ects are captured by both month and year dummies.
4I include as covariates a job (not individual) specific measure of the log of the first month real earnings
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The presence of labor mobility in matched worker-firm dataset enables the identifica-
tion of worker and firm e↵ects. I define good workers as those whose estimated individual
fixed e↵ects fall within the top third of all estimated individual e↵ects. In the on-line
Appendix I display the distributions of these workers and firms fixed e↵ects. Figure (1)
reports the geographic variations across regions of work of employees and firms fixed e↵ects
for the sub-sample of good workers defined as above. The North-South divide that stems
from this geographic variations is clear.5
[Figure 1 about here]
One could argue that this picture illustrates how individuals and firms sort into the
region where they work or operate. If this was the case, the individual migration process
could not be independent of the reform. However, as preliminary analysis, for each re-
gion of birth, the on-line Appendix will display the estimated di↵erence in discontinuity
e↵ects on apprenticeship rates and (permanent) employment rates. These e↵ects are not
statistically di↵erent from those estimated on the basis of the individual region of work
rather than birth. Consistently, there is not any di↵erence in discontinuity in the migra-
tion process.6 Hence, the randomized source of geographic variations that I am exploiting
is the random assignment of individuals into the region where they were born. Unless we
are ready to assume that the skill distribution of individuals at birth is di↵erent across
regions, there might be some regional characteristics that improve (or worsen) the perma-
nent employment prospects of individuals treated by the labor market reform at the age
threshold.
4 Data
Data of the working sample are taken from a very rich administrative dataset by the
Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, CICO (the so-called Comunicazioni Obbligatorie).
In a given year, for each cohort of birth, the dataset gathers all individuals who are born
on the 1st, the 9th, the 10th and the 11th of each month.
It includes, since 2009, the relevant dates (day, month, year) and detailed information
of all job contracts, activated, transformed and dismissed, for dependent and independent
(individuals with VAT number) workers for all sectors including the Agricultural sector
and the Public Administration. The type of labour contract, the region of work and an
anonymous identifier for both the firm and the worker and the type of benefit associated
and a bunch of dummies measuring whether, in a given month and year, the worker’s educational level is
higher than the 25th percentile of the education distribution conditional on age; if the worker’s educational
level is higher than the 75th percentile of the education distribution conditional on age; if the worker’s
past-experience is higher than the 75th percentile of the past-experience distribution conditional on age; if
the worker’s number of monthly multiple job spells is higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding
distribution conditional on age; if the job episode is associated to a number of monthly job separations
higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution conditional on age and region of birth; if
the job episode is associated to a number of monthly net flows (hirings minus separations) higher than the
25th percentile of the corresponding distribution conditional on age and region of birth; if the job episode
benefited of a labor costs reduction higher than the 25th percentile of the corresponding distribution
conditional on age, and if the job episode benefited of social insurance benefits higher than the 25th
percentile of the corresponding distribution conditional on age.
5In the on-line Appendix I displays the geographical variations across regions of birth of these fixed
e↵ects. The North-South divide is even more pronounced.
6All these results are available from request from the author.
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to the contract, if granted, are recorded in the dataset. Moreover, for each worker, I have
information on the gender, the year of birth, the region of birth, citizenship and education.
The working sample is centered in a ±30 months interval around June 2012 when law
no. 92 was issued. This implies that those treated (untreated) by the reform are those who
(didn’t) reach the threshold age of 30 between July 2012 to December 2014 (January 2010
to June 2012) ending up with two and half a↵ected and una↵ected cohorts. Since there is
not precise information on the date of birth of the individual, to minimize measurement
error in the definition of age, the latter is measured at the 31st December of the previous
year. That is to say, for example, that in 2012 an individual is aged 29 with certainty if
she is born in 1982 and she is turning to 30 in an unknown month during that year.
Using the information on the region of work, the database is merged with Bureau Van
Dijk (AIDA) data. Unfortunately, the firm identification code in CICO data is anonymous.
Hence the two datasets can be merged using only information on either the region of work
or the region of birth. I consider the former to keep in my sample also foreign workers.
AIDA contains comprehensive information on all Italian companies required to file their
accounts, approximately 1 million companies. I consider those with a non-missing value on
revenues amounting to 919, 456 (2010), 939, 488 (2011), 937, 170 (2012), 940, 106 (2013) and
947, 449 (2014) firms. However, I complement the analysis using other regional enterprises
economic indicators provided by the Italian Statistical O ce (ISTAT): the number of all
active firms in a region; the regional firms’ turnover rate; the share of high-tech firms over
all regional firms; and the share of employees in high-tech occupation over all regional
workers. I consider also several regional human capital indicators provided by ISTAT:
the regional percentage of those who scored the maximum (minimum) level in the PISA
test in math and reading performance; the regional share of upper secondary students who
repeat the schooling year; the average number of enrolles per class and the average number
of enrolles per school in upper secondary education; the regional dropout rate at upper
secondary education. This allows me to provide a comprehensive view of the role of the
education and production system that is not relegated to a specific measure.
I restrict the age interval of ±1 years around the age threshold considering only those
who started either a job spell or a self-employment activity7 in a given year. The working
sample, therefore, amounts to 2, 132, 899 observations gathering 168,542 individuals and
152,225 firms.
5 Empirical model
I start by assuming that the data generating process of the apprenticeship rate is based on
the legal rule that, in Italy, job entry as apprentice is only available, albeit not mandatory,
up to 29 years and 364 days of age. This yields to a deterministic process of the appren-
ticeship rate on one side of the cuto↵ of 30 years. As a consequence, the data generating
process of permanent employment rate exhibits a discontinuity around this age threshold
that can only be related to the apprenticeship rate. On the top of that, I expect that the in-
troduction of law no. 92/2012 has exogenously changed this data generating process. This
setting allows me to design a di↵erence in discontinuity regression model. In the on-line
Appendix, I present suggestive evidence on the main assumption of the design. Potential
outcome is continuous in age because individuals and firms have imprecise control on the
age at which the apprenticeship labor contract is signed (if it is signed). The validity of
7I have information on self-employment activities by merging CICO data with two datasets recording
self-employment and independent jobs episodes in the professional orders.
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this hypothesis has two main implications. First, observable covariates are irrelevant and
unnecessary for identification. This is because the randomized variation allows to compare
individuals who have similar observable and unobservable characteristics. Second, as long
as the variation is randomized the conditional independence assumption with respect to
the individual’s region of work (and birth) holds. This design, then, creates a suitable
framework to estimate the geographic variation in permanent job creation and its rela-
tionship with the regional education and production systems. The regression model 2 is,
therefore, augmented to grant for heterogeneous e↵ects which rely on the characteristics
of the regional systems. This is a restricted model specification of a di↵erence in regres-
sion discontinuity design. These model restrictions are imposed by the data since I have











where yi,t is the outcome for individual i at time (year, month) t; kit is an indicator
function which takes the value of 1 if the individual, given her age and year of birth, is
treated by law no. 92/2012 and dit is an indicator function that takes the value of 1
if the person is aged less than 30 years and vi are the dummies for the quartiles of the
distribution of a regional indicator for either the education or the production system.
That is to say, for instance, that the dummy for the second quartile takes the value of
1 if a certain region sits in the second quartile of the distribution of this regional indicator.
The ignorability assumption clearly holds here since individuals cannot control the features
of the distribution of regional indicators that determine the relative position of the region
where they work.
In what follows, I will consider as outcome y: the employment probability, the perma-
nent employment probability and the apprenticeship probability.
The interpretation of the Intention To Treat, ITT , parameter,  1, simplifies to mea-
suring to what extent, around the age threshold, the outcome of interest changes for
individuals treated by law no. 92/2012 compared to similar individuals born in contiguous
cohorts, who reached the threshold age before the introduction of the law. However, equa-
tion 2 implies that the di↵erence in discontinuity impact may di↵er across the regional
position (quartiles) in the distribution of the regional indicator of either the education or
production system. Hence being born at the right time to be treated by a reform, that
reinforces the open-ended nature of apprenticeships, in the right place, where the regional
context favors the successfulness of the contract, matters. Similar untreated individuals
who didn’t grow up in such favorable environment have lower permanent employment
probabilities.
To strengthen this interpretation I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting. The
following regression model takes into account the persistency in outcome generated by the
exogenous shock of the reform at the age threshold8 and allows to retrieve the dynamic
ITT parameter:
8That is to say that I expect that if job entry as apprentice serves as stepping stone into permanent
employment, in the months following the baseline, the current permanent employment position depends
also on the permanent employment position at the baseline which in turn is related to the impact of the
labor market reform around the age cuto↵.
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mates the dynamic ITT e↵ects.
The model is estimated in the range of ±1 year of age around the cuto↵. For this
reason, it is not possible to include in equation 2 the forcing variable age (parameterized
as deviation from 30) that is perfectly collinear with the indicator function dit. In fact, the
discrete character of the age variable forces the regression model to require a functional
form assumption. I can show that this functional form assumption is supported by the
data in the smallest age range.9 Nevertheless, if potential outcome is continuous in age and
the parametric model is not too restrictive, the appealing characteristics of the regression
discontinuity design are preserved.
6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Preliminary analysis and validity of the empirical model
In what follows I discuss very briefly the important evidence, reported for the sake of
brevity in the on-line Appendix A1 and B1, on the validity of the model, on its graphical
analysis and its estimation allowing for heterogeneous e↵ects across regions of birth.
The main assumption of the research design is the absence of precise sorting related
to the age at which job entry as apprentices occurs (if occurs). The same assumption on
the other source of random variation is trivially satisfied. In fact, individuals cannot have
precise manipulation over their year of birth. To validate the analysis I follow Lee and
Lemieux (2010). I consider in the age range between 25 and 35 years of age (measured as
deviations from 30) all individuals who have started a job spell of at least one day in a
given year of the sample period. For each region of birth, I plot the density of the residuals
V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable characteristics X
(grouped by gender, sector of activity and level of education) and on the quartiles of the
distribution of the residuals U of the di↵erence in discontinuity regression model on per-
manent employment probability. This suggestive evidence builds on the Bayes’ Rule.10.
In fact, there is not precise control over the age at which the apprenticeship labor contract
occur when Pr[a|X = x, U = u] is identical on either side of the cuto↵ in the limit of
the threshold. Putting it di↵erently, the distributions of U , V conditional on age are not
truncated in age if there exist a certain degree of randomness in the sorting process.11
For each region of birth, consistently with a treatment that is locally randomized, the
histograms indicate that the conditional distributions of observed and unobserved charac-
9These results are available upon request from the author.
10That is, Pr[X = x, U = u|A = a] = Pr[a|X = x, U = u]Pr[X=x,U=u]Pr(a) , where Pr(a) and Pr[a|X =
x, U = u] are marginal and conditional densities
11Although, the graphs plot the density of V rather than the density of age, these graphs provide the
same informational contents since the two distributions are equivalent up to a translation shift.
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teristics on either side of the age cuto↵ in the limit of the threshold do not di↵er.12 Hence,
the conditional independence assumption holds.
I compute and graph the raw di↵erence in means between treated and untreated co-
horts of the outcome variable (permanent employment probability, apprenticeship proba-
bility and employment probability) for each of the ten values of the discrete assignment
variable, age in each region. Here region is defined as the region where the worker was born
and where he/she likely grew up. A drawback of the data is that I have not information
on the timing of individuals’ mobility before 2009. Individuals born outside Italy belong
to a hypothetical 21st region. The graphical analysis is important since it gives a rough
sense of the relationship and the shape of the age profile of the di↵erence in the outcome
variable before and after the labor market reform in each region of birth. In these graphs
I superimpose the fit of the third order polynomial in age (99% confidence intervals). The
Figure indicates that locally, ±1 year around the age cuto↵, the linear model specification
is likely to be supported by the data. In fact, the estimated parameter perfectly matches
the raw data. These plots reveal the existence of an instantaneous di↵erence in discontinu-
ity positive impact on the apprenticeship probability for the large majority of the Italian
regions with the exception of Trentino Alto Adige, Molise, Sardegna, Umbria and Valle
d’Aosta. Consistent results are obtained if I consider the region where individuals work.13
This is reassuring since it implies that the randomized source of variation that I am ex-
ploiting to unpack regional disparities in apprenticeship and permanent employment rates
stems from the random assignment of individuals to regions at birth. The interpretation of
this finding points to the importance of the informational costs of apprenticeships that are
smaller for individuals born in the same region where they work. The regions, that failed
to increase the apprenticeship rate of cohorts treated by the labor market reform at the
age threshold compared to the apprenticeship rate of similar untreated individuals, rather
than reflecting a North-South divide, have in common the small dimension of their labor
markets. The graphs also clearly indicate regional disparities in the intensity of the posi-
tive impact on the apprenticeship rate and the extent to which this impact translates into
di↵erence in discontinuity for the permanent employment probability. There is not instead
graphical evidence on a di↵erence in discontinuity e↵ect on the employment probability.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 instead displays how the number of active firms distributes over the Italian
regions. Di↵erent colors refer to di↵erent quartiles of the distribution: from the lightest to
the darkest blue. The size of the regional markets plays a role with smaller (or with low
population density) regions sitting in the lowest quartile. From this angle, the North-South
divide does not clearly emerge. In the on-line Appendix, I present the regional distribution
of the number of active firms by sectors and firm size. It is also reported the regional
distribution of sectoral share of value added. It is clear that the southern (and Trentino)
regions have the highest share of value added in agriculture. Nevertheless, the overall
regional distribution of the number of active firms is quite similar to those that decompose
it by firms size and sectors. This might implies that the number of firms with long-term
production opportunities matters more than either firm size nor sectoral compositions
to explaining regional disparities in apprenticeship and permanent employment rates. In
12Further preliminary tests on the parametric model specification and tests on the balancing-out of
covariates are available upon request from the author. All this evidence supports the regression design and
it is not reported to save space.
13These results are available upon request from the author.
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contrast, the North-South divide appears looking at panel (b) of the same Figure. All the
southern part of Italy, including main islands, is below the median value of the distribution
of the percentage of students who scored the highest level in math PISA tests.14
These figures set the premises and constitute good grounds for what follows. Un-
packing these geographic variations in regional educational institutions and in the average
characteristics of the firms in a region could be important to understand the extent to
which a labor contract committed to a human capital investment creates a job match that
persists over time.
6.2 Estimation results
As discussed above, automatic conversion rates into standard permanent labor contracts
of apprenticeships is quite heterogeneous across Italian regions. The 2012 labor market re-
form sets nationwide rules on the basis of which it is not obvious that di↵erences across the
regions where the workers were born arise. Yet, the region of birth in the majority of cases
constitutes the environment where the individual grew up and was educated. The current
literature on the determinants of a labor contract which increases human capital has mainly
emphasized the role of commitment (Dustmann and Scho¨nberg 2012) to the training pro-
vision in a framework of asymmetric information (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Acemoglu
and Pischke 1999). In such a setting the commitment to the human capital investment con-
stitutes a necessary requirement. The successfulness of the apprenticeship labor contract
to serve as a port of entry into permanent employment could also depend on whether and
to what extent the complementarities between the on-the-job human capital accumulation
and the individual’s competencies and skills are related to the sorting of the individuals
and to the screening of the firms in a given job. These sorting-screening processes could
be driven by signals which are observable. The general education level, and where it was
achieved, stands above all the other signals. If this true, the educational and other ob-
servational signals of the migrants could be much weaker than that of the locals because
firms are much better informed on the educational and environmental context of the region
where they operate. All in all, this evidence points to the importance of the informational
content of the apprenticeship labor contract suggesting that the observational signals of
those born in the region where the firm operates are stronger.15
I use ISTAT data on the regional percentage of those, aged 15, who scored the max-
imum (minimum) level in the PISA test in mathematics and reading. These percentages
are then averaged out over time (2006-2015). Quality of the upper secondary education
system is higher (lower) the higher the quartiles of the distribution of these regional per-
centages.16 Figure (3) suggests that this let the sorting-screening processes of individuals
and firms be more successful because asymmetric information are reduced and, possibly,
because there could be complementarities between former education and the on-the-job
human capital accumulation process. In fact, the di↵erence in discontinuity e↵ects on the
outcomes of interest varies across quartiles of the distribution of the percentage of those
14Similar pictures can be provided for the PISA reading test and for the distribution of students who
scored the minimum level in these tests. In such a case, all southern regions are above the median of the
distribution.
15The distance between the individual’s hometown and the location of the workplace might be negatively
correlated with the power of the signal. Hence, I cannot exclude that there is important geographic variation
within regions that I am unable to account for. This is because I have only information at regional level.
16Even though students involved in these tests are younger than those considered in my analysis, this
might not be an issue. In fact, what is relevant to the analysis that will follow is the regional ranking
(quartiles of the distribution of the average regional score) that is quite stable over time.
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who scored the maximum (minimum) level in math test. Clearly, the lowest quality is as-
sociated to the smallest ITT impact on the apprenticeship rate. Moreover, the permanent
employment probability at the age cuto↵ of treated individuals compared to the perma-
nent employment rate of those untreated are not statistically di↵erent when the regional
quality of the education system is low. Similar results, reported in the on-line Appendix,
can be found when I use the score in the reading performance test. This evidence suggests
that it is more likely that the apprenticeship labor contract serves as a stepping stone into
permanent employment in a context where the quality of the former education system is
not too low. If this is the case, the same individual with the same observable characteris-
tics would increase more her productivity in a firm rather than in another. Consequently,
disparities across regions emerge because the strength of these complementarities di↵ers
across regions and some regions could experience larger permanent employment gains than
others.
[Figure 3 about here]
Moreover, in regions, where the quality of the regional education system is higher, these
complementarities amplify the initial advantages leading to a higher permanent employ-
ment gain over time. Figure (4) shows that after 30 months from the baseline, the positive
dynamic ITT impact associated to the regions with the lowest educational performance
is equal to 4% and it doubles to about 8% for the regions with the highest educational
achievements.17 There is a clear mapping of the North-South divide on the impacts on per-
manent employment with the North-South strong divide in schooling performances. For
instance regions that have the highest (lowest) percentage of students who just scored the
maximum (minimum) level in the math test are: Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giu-
lia, Lombardia and Veneto (Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sardegna and Sicilia).
This North-South divide dualise further the Italian dual labor market.
[Figure 4 about here]
One could argue that definite conclusions cannot be drawn on the sole basis of the
PISA test scores. In fact, there is an ample literature showing that the PISA score tests
do not really reflect the underlying quality of the education system, due to several reasons
(see, inter alia Araujo, Saltelli and Schnepf (2017), or Hopfenbeck, Lenkeit, El Masri,
Cantrell, Ryan and Baird (2018) for some recent evidence). To avoid that conclusions
based on the assumption of di↵erences in the regional education systems could be wrong
due to a rather imperfect education quality measure, in the on-line Appendix I explore
alternative measures of the regional quality of the education. I use ISTAT regional data
on the percentage of those who repeat the schooling year, the average number of enrolles
per class and the average number of enrolles per school in upper secondary education,
the average dropout rate in upper secondary education.18 The main message of the paper
does not change. Moreover, the geographic variation in PISA math test scores maps better
17The size of this di↵erential is consistent if education quality is instead measured by the lower percentage
of those scoring the minimum level in the PISA math test.
18The percentage of those repeating the schooling year is calculated as the number of those who repeat
the schooling year over the total number of enrolles at upper secondary school in a given region; the average
number of enrolles per class is calculated as the total number of enrolles over the total number of classes in
a region, the average number of enrolles per school as the total number of enrolles over the total number
of schools in a region, the regional share of dropout rate is calculates as the total number of students who
dropout over the total number of enrolles in upper secondary education.
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than the other indicators the North-South divide in permanent employment gains in the
medium-run. Hence, these robustness checks are also helpful to show that PISA test scores
are the best indicators of the quality of the regional education system. This is possibly
because these test scores better capture unobservable complementarities between former
education and later on-the-job training.
Nevertheless, this interpretation fails to fully explain why the static impact on the
apprenticeship labor contract is statically not di↵erent from zero when the dimension of
the regional labor market is limited (Trentino Alto Adige, Molise, Sardegna, Umbria and
Valle d’Aosta). Hence, I consider some characteristics of the regional labor market which
could work as a barrier to increase the quantity of the apprenticeship labor contracts. The
number of productive firms with expected long-term production opportunities in a region
could fix the quantity of the apprenticeship labor contracts by limiting the successfulness
of the screening of the firms and the sorting into apprenticeships of the workers. In fact,
considering the framework presented by Cahuc et al. (2016), the lower the number of
productive firms, the lower the expected production opportunities, the higher the number
of temporary job contracts which are created to fulfill these production opportunities with
short expected durations. I use the AIDA (Bureau van Dijk) database to determine the
number of firms with a non-missing record on total revenues in each region from 2010
to 2014. These amounts are averaged out across time to possibly smooth out excess of
variability in this number. I then draw the distribution of the resulting quantities assigning
a value equal to 1 to the quartile of the distribution to which the region belongs.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figure (5) clearly shows that the static e↵ect on the apprenticeship rate is lower at
the lowest quartiles albeit it is not much di↵erent from the one estimated at the fourth.
However, heterogeneous behavior emerges when looking at the impact on permanent em-
ployment.19 In fact, there are no di↵erence in discontinuity e↵ects on permanent employ-
ment for those regions that are characterized by a lower (compared to the other regions)
number of active firms. Therefore, the dimension of the regional labor market can be a
barrier to the quantity of potential successful apprenticeship labor contract. In the on-line
Appendix I show the robustness of this finding using other indicators of the regional pro-
duction system (the number of active firms in the ISTAT regional database, the variance
of the regional distribution of non-missing total revenues of firms recorded in AIDA, the
regional average turnover rate of the firms, the proportion of high tech firms in a region,
the share of employees in high tech firms over the total number of employees in a region).
This robustness check also points to the importance of the presence of high tech firms in
a region.
6.3 Do regional variations in education and production systems explain
geographic variations in workers and firms fixed e↵ects?
Figure (1) displays a North-South divide in the distributions of workers and firms fixed
e↵ects in the sub sample of good workers. The North-South divide is also a feature of the
distributions of PISA test scores. To investigate further this issue, figure 6 shows a plot
of the quantiles of the distribution of the worker fixed e↵ects obtained from estimating
equation 1, comparing the quantile of individual fixed e↵ects located in regions that sit
19The instantaneous ITT impact on the apprenticeship rate for the second and third quartiles matches
the e↵ect on the permanent employment while it is lower for the fourth quartile.
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the highest quartile of the distribution of the percentage of students scoring the maximum
level in the PISA math test (x axis) against the quantiles of the distribution of these
individual fixed e↵ects located in the remaining regions (y axis). Points on the right-hand
side of the 45 line mean that the values of the distribution on the X axis are higher than
those of the distribution on the Y-axis. Since many points are on the right-hand side
of the main diagonal, it seems reasonable to conclude that employees working in region
where the quality of the upper secondary schooling system is high have higher unobserved
ability for given observable characteristics. These skills and competencies when adopted
in a good firm environment, likely interact with skills and competencies that are developed
by on-the job training.
[Figure 6 about here]
Below I revisit this question in a regression framework and again conclude that the
education and production system matters for the creation of a job position that persists
over time. In fact, as a final remark one could argue that production and education systems
should be treated jointly, and not in isolation. There could be potential interactions
between both systems that could a↵ect the outcome of the apprenticeship contract reform.
[Table 1 about here]
Tables (1) and (2) show the regions that sit both in the highest quartile of the per-
centage of those who scored the maximum level in the math PISA test and in the highest
quartile of the distributions of the number of active firms benefit of the highest perma-
nent employment gains. This evidence holds true instantaneously (i.e. static e↵ect) and
it strengthens further over time (i.e. after 30 months from the baseline). Overall, when
interacted with the characteristics of the production system, the indicator of the education
system that performs best is the PISA math test score. For instance, the static di↵erence
in discontinuity impact on permanent employment probability is positive for all the in-
dicators of school quality, albeit these are not relevant factors when interacted with the
number of high tech firms in the region. Hence, skills and competencies tested by the
PISA tests at upper secondary schools are most likely to predict the future pattern of the
individual’s occupational prospects.
[Table 2 about here]
In sum, on the one hand the quantity of the potential successful jobs is limited by a
fixed number of productive firms. On the other hand, when the quality of the education
system is low, the capacity of the apprenticeship labor contract to serve as a stepping
stone into permanent employment is limited. As a result, geographic variations in perma-
nent employment rates stems from geographic variations in the education and production
systems.
7 Conclusions
In this study I analyze the relationship between the geographic variation in apprenticeship
and consequent permanent employment rates and the geographic variation in the regional
education and production systems. I seek to unpack these geographic variations to inves-
tigate under which circumstances a labor contract, committed to the provision of human
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capital investment, succeeds in creating a job match that persists over time. I do this
by using a very rich administrative dataset by the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social
Policies, (CICO). The approach is innovative in its granular specificity to the study of
static and dynamic permanent employment rate in the analysis of the particular regional
environment associated with these di↵erences. To my knowledge, this is the first study that
empirically measures the geographical di↵erences in permanent jobs created by a costly
human capital investment across an array of di↵erent types of indicators of the quality
of the education and production systems that might explain these distinctions. In my
research design, I exploit the randomized variability introduced by a labor market reform
at the age cuto↵ of 30 years, above which job entry as apprentice is not possible. On the
basis of this unique setting, the conditional independent assumption between the location
of work and this randomized variability holds. On the top of that, I exploit the random
assignment of individuals to regions at birth. I find that the Italian North-South divide in
the quality of general education maps into and further amplifies the North-South divide in
labor market performances. This is possibly because of the existence of complementarities
between former education and on-the-job human capital accumulation. These complemen-
tarities are a necessary but not su cient condition to create apprenticeship job positions
that translate into occupations that persists over time. In fact, the limited number of
active firms with expected long-term employment opportunities in a region is a barrier
to the quantity of job entries as apprentices. However, this rich administrative dataset
contains information at the region of work and region of birth level only. It is likely that a
comprehensive view of the economic geography of permanent job creation requires a within
region analysis that integrates this across regions evaluation. This challenging project is
left to future research.
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Regional variation in apprenticeship and permanent
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1 Figures
(a) Individual fixed e↵ects (b) Firms fixed e↵ects
Notes: Firm and individual e↵ects that are obtained estimating equation (4) for the period January 2010-
December 2014. The two panels show the geographic variations across regions of work in workers and firms
fixed e↵ects for the sub-sample of good workers. Good workers are define as those above the 67th percentile
of the individual fixed e↵ects distribution.
Figure 1: Geographical variations in worker and firm fixed e↵ects: across regions of work
1
(a) Number of active firms in a region. (b) Percentage with high scores in math PISA test
Notes: Data source: Aida and Italian Statical O ce.
Figure 2: Geographical variations in the number of active firms in a region and the average
regional PISA high test scores in math
2
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
(d) Employment Prob. (e) Apprenticeship Prob. (f) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure 3: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional per-
centage of high (low) level of math PISA test scores
(a) Minimum level math. (b) Maximum level math.
Figure 4: Di↵erential permanent employment probability gains after 30 months from the
baseline across the distribution of the regional percentage of high (low) level of math PISA
test scores
3
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Notes: Data source: AIDA. The dimension of the regional labor market is measured by the average
number of firms in a region with non missing records on total revenues between 2010 and 2014.





Non-high interaction High interaction
High number of firms and high math score 0.009 0.019
0.003 0.005
[0.001-0.017] [0.007-0.030]
High firms’ turnover rate and high math score 0.011 0.016
0.003 0.005
[0.003-0.019] [0.003-0.028]
High employment rate in high tech and high math score 0.009 0.021
0.003 0.006
[0.001-0.017] [0.007-0.035]
High number of high tech firms and high math score 0.011 0.019
0.003 0.007
[0.003-0.018] [0.001-0.037]
High number of high tech firms and low repeating schooling year rate 0.012 0.012
0.003 0.017
[0.005-0.019] [ 0.031-0.055]
High number of high tech firms and low ratio of n. students per class 0.012 0.002
0.003 0.012
[0.005-0.019] [ 0.028-0.033]
High number of high tech firms and low dropout rate in upper secondary schools 0.012 0.007
0.003 0.013
[0.005-0.019] [ 0.027-0.041]
High number of high tech firms and low ratio of n. students per school 0.010 0.017
0.003 0.005
[0.002-0.019] [0.004-0.031]
Notes: (Non)-High interaction is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if the region sits both
in the highest quartile of the quality indicator of the upper secondary school system (i.e. in the lowest
quartile when higher quality is associated to a lower value of the indicator, such as for instance the case of
the dropout rate) and in the highest quartile of the distribution of characteristics of the production system
(such as for instance the number of active firms).
Table 1: Di↵erence-in-discontinuity impact on permanent employment: interaction be-
tween education quality and production system.
Permanent employment
Non-high interaction High interaction
High number of firms and high math score  0.073 0.174
0.043 0.048
[ 0.183-0.038] [0.052-0.297]
High firms’ turnover rate and high math score  0.059  0.261
0.043 0.064
[ 0.168-0.051] [ 0.426- 0.097]
High employment rate in high tech and high math score  0.043 0.155
0.043 0.039
[ 0.154-0.067] [0.055-0.256]
High number of high tech firms and high math score  0.032 0.128
0.041 0.049
[ 0.137-0.072] [0.003-0.253]
High number of high tech firms and low repeating schooling year rate  0.004  0.079
0.038 0.169
[ 0.101-0.092] [ 0.511-0.354]
High number of high tech firms and low ratio of n. students per class  0.008  0.200
0.035 0.310
[ 0.098-0.083] [ 0.994-0.593]
High number of high tech firms and low dropout rate in upper secondary schools  0.004  0.039
0.036 0.143
[ 0.096-0.089] [ 0.404-0.326]
High number of high tech firms and low ratio of n. students per school  0.026 0.038
0.043 0.043
[ 0.137-0.085] [ 0.071-0.148]
Notes: (Non)-High interaction is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if the region sits both
in the highest quartile of the quality indicator of the upper secondary school system (i.e. in the lowest
quartile when higher quality is associated to a lower value of the indicator, such as for instance the case of
the dropout rate) and in the highest quartile of the distribution of characteristics of the production system
(such as for instance the number of active firms).
Table 2: Dynamic di↵erence-in-discontinuity impact on permanent employment after 30
months: interaction between education quality and production system.
5
(a) Individual fixed e↵ects comparing regions by scores
in math PISA test.
(b) Firms fixed e↵ects comparing regions by number of
high tech firms.
Notes:
Shown is a quantile-quantile plot of worker and firms e↵ects in 2010-2014.
Figure 6: Quantile-quantile plot: worker and firm e↵ects
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Regional variation in apprenticeship and permanent
employment rates: which causes?
Content
This appendix is organized as follows. Section A1 is devoted to present additional ma-
terials. It is first discussed whether the region of birth matters. Then it is presented an
analysis on the role of the uncertainty in the regional labor market. For each region, sec-
tion B1 displays the graphical analysis. Then the density plot of the residual of the age
regression on covariates is reported.
1
A1 Additional materials
(a) Individual fixed e↵ects (b) Firms fixed e↵ects
Notes: Figure A1 displays firm and individual e↵ects that are obtained estimating equation (4) in the
main text for the period January 2010-December 2014. The solid vertical line defines the 67th percentile
of the individual fixed e↵ects ( 0.013) and the 67th percentile of the firm fixed e↵ects (0.027). The second
x axis reports also the mean (4.196e-17, individual fixed e↵ect; .035, firm fixed e↵ects) and the standard
deviations of the two distributions.
Figure A1: Worker and firm fixed e↵ects distributions.
2
(a) Individual fixed e↵ects (b) Firms fixed e↵ects
Notes: Firm and individual e↵ects that are obtained estimating equation (4) for the period January 2010-
December 2014. The two panels show the geographic variations across regions of birth in workers and firms
fixed e↵ects for the sub-sample of good workers. Good workers are define as those above the 67th percentile
of the individual fixed e↵ects distribution.
Figure A2: Geographical variations in worker and firm fixed e↵ects: across regions of birth
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A1.1 Does the environment where the individual was born matter?
In equation (1) represents the permanent employment (apprenticeship rate) rate premium
of the labor market reform around the cuto↵ of 30 years of age. I extend the model to
allow for heterogeneous impact across regions by introducing interaction terms between
the di↵erence in discontinuity parameter and the workers’ region of birth dummies. These
static e↵ects are consistent with the di↵erence in the mean values of the outcomes between
treated and untreated cohorts at the age threshold illustrated in the following appendix
??. This consistency supports the validity of the research design. Figure A3 shows that
Trentino Alto Adige, Molise, Sardegna, Umbria and Valle d’Aosta are the only regions
where the static ITT parameter on the apprenticeship rate is not statistically di↵erent from
zero. In contrast, for Calabria, Campania, Emilia Romagna, Liguria, Piemonte, Puglia and
Sicilia this impact is slightly higher than the corresponding e↵ect estimated for those who
are working in these regions independently on where they were born. This positive gain is,
instead, moderate for Basilicata (the e↵ect is statistically di↵erent from zero at 5% level),
Lombardia, Marche, Valle d’Aosta and Veneto. The 21th region of birth gathers all foreign
workers. For them, the static ITT impact is positive and statically di↵erent from zero.
However, it is smaller when compared to the corresponding impact for individuals born in
all the other Italian regions. The figure suggests also the extent to which a static positive
impact on the apprenticeship rate translates into an e↵ect on the permanent employment
probability: the static ITT parameter is positive and statistically di↵erent from zero (at
5% level) for Campania, Emilia Romagna, Lazio, Lombardia, Marche, Piemonte, Veneto
and for those born abroad. Overall there is no e↵ect on the employment probability with
the exception of foreign workers who could possibly be the recipients of the hiring incentive
fixed by legislative decree no 76/2013.
(a) Apprenticeship Prob. (b) Employment Prob. (c) Permanent Employment Prob.
Figure A3: Di↵erence in discontinuity: di↵erential impact across regions of birth
Figure A4 presents instead the dynamic ITT parameters on the outcomes of interest
after 12, 24 and 30 months from the baseline allowing for heterogeneous e↵ects across
regions of birth. While there are no significant e↵ects for those working in Molise, the
di↵erence in discontinuity impact on the apprenticeship probability for those who were
born there, is positive and statistically di↵erent from zero after 12, 24 and 30 months.
However, the corresponding positive gain in terms of permanent employment vanishes out
after 24 months. Overall, individuals treated by the labor market reform at the age cuto↵
increased their permanent employment rate compared to untreated individuals. At 30
months from the baseline, those born in Trentino Alto Adige benefit of the highest impact
on the permanent employment rate (about 12.7%) followed by Emilia Romagna, Veneto,
Umbria, Piemonte and Toscana (around 8%). The di↵erence in discontinuity medium-run
impact for those born in Sardegna and Puglia is in the same order of magnitude of the
4
corresponding impact for those working in these regions independently on where they were
born. Those who were born in Abruzzo, Trentino Alto Adige, Campania, Friuli Venezia
Giulia and Sicilia (Liguria) and treated by the labor market reform at the age threshold
increased their permanent employment probability more (less) than 1% compared to the
corresponding impact on those working in these regions. Finally, workers born in Calabria
and Basilicata gain more if they migrate but less than 1% compared to those who work in
these regions.
(a) After 12 months. (b) After 12 months. (c) After 12 months.
(d) After 24 months. (e) After 24 months. (f) After 24 months.
(g) After 30 months. (h) After 30 months. (i) After 30 months.
Figure A4: Di↵erence in discontinuity: di↵erential impact across regions of birth over time
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A1.2 Robustness to other indicators of the quality of the education sys-
tem
A1.2.1 Regional percentage of those who scored the highest (lowest) level in
reading PISA test.
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
(d) Employment Prob. (e) Apprenticeship Prob. (f) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A5: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional per-
centage of high (low) level of reading PISA test scores
(a) Minimum level reading. (b) Maximum level reading.
Figure A6: Di↵erential permanent employment probability gains after 30 months from the
baseline across the distribution of the regional percentage of high (low) level of reading
PISA test scores
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A1.2.2 Regional average dropout rate in upper secondary school
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A7: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional average
dropout rate in upper secondary school
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A8: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional average dropout rate in upper secondary school
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A1.2.3 Regional proportion of those who repeat the grade in upper secondary
education
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A9: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional average
dropout rate in upper secondary school
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A10: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional average dropout rate in upper secondary school
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A1.2.4 Regional total number of enrolees over the total number of classes in
upper secondary education
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A11: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional total
number of enrolees over the total number of classes in upper secondary education
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A12: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional total number of enrolees over the total number of classes in upper secondary
education
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A1.2.5 Regional total number of enrolees over the total number of schools in
upper secondary education
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A13: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional total
number of enrolees over the total number of classes in upper secondary education
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A14: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional total number of enrolees over the total number of classes in upper secondary
education
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A1.2.6 Regional proportion of high tech firms
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A15: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional
proportion of high tech firms
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A16: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional proportion of high tech firms
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A1.2.7 Regional total number of active firms
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A17: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional
proportion of active firms
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A18: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional proportion of active firms
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A1.2.8 Regional share of employees in high tech firms
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A19: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional share
of employee in high tech firms
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A20: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional share of employee in high tech firms
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A1.2.9 Regional firms’ turnover rate
(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment Prob.
Figure A21: Di↵erential impact at the baseline across the distribution of the regional firms’
turnover rate
(a) Permanent Employment Prob. (b) Employment Prob.
Figure A22: Di↵erential gains after 30 months from the baseline across the distribution of
the regional firms’ turnover rate
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A2 Variance of total revenues
Apprenticeships, rather than other labour contracts, serve as a stepping stone into perma-
nent employment if its human capital component translates into an increase in productivity
shared between the firm (higher rents) and the workers (higher future earnings). These
shared future returns are conditional to a higher probability of working on a permanent
basis in the firm that provided the training. From the employee perspective there are some
analogies with a contract that fix a performance related pay component of the (future)
earnings. The costs of the vocational training and the general education provided by the
contract and the lower initial wage could be compensated by higher future earnings only
if the worker’s productivity increases. A well-known result of the literature is the negative
relationship between uncertainty and performance related pay. The state of the regional
market, an exogenous factor of production, and other sources of luck, cause the worker’s
output to vary even if she provides e↵ort, (Lazear 1986). Consequently, individuals with
the same level of ability and the same degree of risk aversion could find the apprenticeship
labour contract less appealing in regions where uncertainty is high. I use AIDA data to
calculate the variance (averaged out across time) of the distribution of non-missing total
revenues of firms within a region.1 Total revenues are normalised by the number of firms in
the region. I then calculate the quartiles of the distribution of such regional variances and
estimate whether the static ITT impact di↵ers across these quartiles. Figure A23 shows
that there is not a monotonic relationship between the static estimates of the di↵erence
in discontinuity e↵ects and the quartiles of the distribution of variance. This finding is
indicating that there could another possible interpretation of the role of a high regional
variance of the distribution of firms’ total revenues in a region. In fact, a higher variance
could also signal the presence of high productive firms, (Lazear 2000). If high uncertainty
(high variance) could be detrimental to a human capital investment, a low heterogeneity
(low variance) in total revenues could be detrimental as well, if associated to low firms’
productivity. The combination of these two counteracting mechanisms could generate the
non-monotonic relationship observed in the data. Although the di↵erence in discontinuity
impacts on the apprenticeship rates are always precisely estimated and statistically di↵er-
ent from zero, these e↵ects are higher at the second and fourth quartiles of the variance
distribution. This non-monotonic relationship maps into the e↵ects on permanent employ-
ment that are statistically di↵erent from zero at the second and fourth quartiles of the
variance distribution only.2 All in all, this evidence suggests that uncertainty could play a
role but the screening-sorting processes that let the apprenticeship labour contract be the
main port of entry into permanent employment is related to a context where firms’ produc-
tivity (i.e. firms with long-term expected production opportunities) is not low. Although
these long-term expected production opportunities might be considered as a necessary
condition, they could not be su cient to completely explain the regional di↵erences in the
dynamic di↵erence in discontinuity impacts.
1Firms’ productivity could be proxied by the firm’s per worker value added. However, the number of
firms with a non-missing record shrinks too much when alternative measures to the firms’ total revenues
are used.
2The e↵ect on permanent employment at the fourth quartile matches the impact on the apprenticeship
probability. It is instead higher at the second quartile. The latter is the only quartile where a positive
impact on the employment probability could be observed albeit it is imprecisely estimated since it is
statistically di↵erent from zero at 0.12 significance level.
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(a) Employment Prob. (b) Apprenticeship Prob. (c) Permanent employment
Prob.
Figure A23: Di↵erence in discontinuity: di↵erential impact across variance of the regional
firms’ total revenues
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A3 Regional sectoral and firm size composition
(a) Size: 0 to 9 workers. (b) Size: 10 to 49 workers.
(c) Size: 50 to 249 workers. (d) Size: more than 249 workers.
Figure A24: Geographical variations in number of firms by firm class size
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(a) Agriculture. (b) Industry. (c) Retail trade, transportations and
accommodation.
(d) Comunications, Financial and real
estate.
(e) Other services. (f) Total number of active firms in a
region.
Figure A25: Geographical variations in number of firms by sectors
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(a) Agriculture. (b) Industry. (c) Retail trade, transportations and
accommodation.
(d) Comunications, Financial and real
estate.
(e) Other services.
Figure A26: Geographical variations in sectoral share of regional value added
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B1 Graphical analysis region by region
B1.1 Abruzzo
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B1: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Abruzzo
Figure B2: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.2 Basilicata
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B3: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Basilicata
Figure B4: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.3 Trentino Alto Adige
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B5: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Trentino Alto Adige.
Figure B6: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.4 Calabria
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B7: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Calabria.
Figure B8: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.5 Campania
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B9: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Campania
Figure B10: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.6 Emilia Romagna
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B11: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Emilia Romagna
Figure B12: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
25
B1.7 Friuli Venezia Giulia
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B13: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Friuli Venezia Giulia.
Figure B14: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
26
B1.8 Lazio
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B15: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Lazio.
Figure B16: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.9 Liguria
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B17: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Liguria.
Figure B18: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.10 Lombardia
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B19: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Lombardia.
Figure B20: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.11 Marche
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B21: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Marche.
Figure B22: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.12 Molise
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B23: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Molise.
Figure B24: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.13 Piemonte
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B25: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Piemonte.
Figure B26: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.14 Puglia
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B27: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Puglia.
Figure B28: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.15 Sardegna
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B29: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Sardegna.
Figure B30: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.16 Sicilia
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B31: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Sicilia.
Figure B32: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.17 Toscana
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B33: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Toscana.
Figure B34: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
36
B1.18 Umbria
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B35: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Umbria.
Figure B36: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.19 Valle d’Aosta
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B37: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Valle d’Aosta.
Figure B38: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.20 Veneto
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B39: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those born in Veneto.
Figure B40: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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B1.21 Foreign citizenship
(a) Apprenticeship Probability. (b) Employment Probability. (c) Permanent Employment Proba-
bility.
Figure B41: Di↵erence in discontinuity for those with a foreign citizenship.
Figure B42: Density of the residuals of age conditional on observable characteristics and
quartile of the distributions of residuals of equation (1) where permanent employment
probability is the outcome variable.
(a) First quartile (b) Second quartile
(c) Third quartile (d) Fourth quartile
Notes: Density of the residuals V of the forcing variables (age a) regression conditional on observable
characteristics X (grouped by gender, region of birth, sector of activity and level of education) and on the
quartiles of the distribution of the residuals U of equation 1 augmented by covariates.
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